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8	BEFORE THE FAIR POLITICAL PRACTICES COMMISSION		
9	OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA		
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11	In the Matter of:	OAH No. 2011030835	
12		FPPC No. 10/449	
13	SHONG-CHING TONG,	OPENING BRIEF OF THE ENFORCEMENT DIVISION OF THE FAIR POLITICAL	
14		PRACTICES COMMISSION RE: PROPOSED DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW	
15	Respondent.	JUDGE ERIC SAWYER	
16			
17	I. INTRODUCTION		
18	On October 26, 2011, Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Eric Sawyer (of the Los Angeles Office		
19	of Administrative Hearings) issued a proposed decision imposing an administrative penalty in the amoun		
20	of \$5,250 against the above-named respondent.		
21	On November 3, 2011, the Legal Division of the Fair Political Practices Commission		
22	("Commission" or "FPPC"), caused a copy of the proposed decision to be served on the Enforcement		
23	Division and Respondent Shong-Ching Tong. (The proposed decision is attached hereto as Exhibit A.)		
24	Pursuant to California Code of Regulations, title 2, section 18361.9, the Enforcement Division		
25	submits this opening brief and respectfully recommends that the Commission adopt the proposed		
26	decision of the ALJ for the reasons discussed below.		
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	OPENING BRIEF OF THE ENFORCEMENT DIVISION RE: PROPOSED DECISION OF ALJ FPPC Case No. 10/449		

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II. DISCUSSION

A. Summary of the Case

This matter was heard before the ALJ on September 13 and 14, 2011, in Los Angeles, California. The FPPC was represented by Neal Bucknell, Senior Commission Counsel, Enforcement Division. Respondent Shong-Ching Tong ("Respondent") attended the hearing and was represented by his attorney, Stefan Robert Pancer.

In this case, Paul Cheng was a candidate for Arcadia City Council in the election that was held on April 13, 2010.

Mr. Cheng also is an attorney. In the scope of his practice, he filed a lawsuit against a business in the San Gabriel Valley area. Respondent became involved with helping to defend the defendants in that lawsuit, and Respondent campaigned against Mr. Cheng in connection with the Arcadia City Council election. (See Ex. A, p. 2.)

In January 2010, Respondent believed that he had reached a settlement agreement with Mr. Cheng regarding the lawsuit mentioned above. The terms included the following: (i) Mr. Cheng would dismiss the lawsuit in exchange for a \$5,000 payment from Respondent; (ii) Respondent would stop campaigning against Mr. Cheng; and (iii) Respondent would help Mr. Cheng win the election. However, the settlement was not finalized. Mr. Cheng withdrew from the case, and Respondent continued his campaign against Mr. Cheng. (See Exhibit B hereto, which comprises the second of two mass mailings in this case, and which was admitted into evidence at the hearing. Ex. B includes a letter from Respondent dated March 25, 2010, in which Respondent admits to the foregoing facts surrounding the settlement negotiations.)

On or about March 15 and April 6, 2010, Respondent made independent expenditures totaling approximately \$2,800 and \$6,575, respectively, for two "Don't Vote for Cheng" mailers. Both mailers cast Mr. Cheng in a negative light and expressly advocated his defeat, stating words such as, "Do Not Give Your Vote to Paul Cheng." The first mailer was sent to 60% of the voters from the previous city election, or about 6,000 people. The second mailer was sent to approximately 26,000 people, using the services and bulk permit of another person. (See Ex. A, p. 2.)

Ultimately, Mr. Cheng was defeated in the election, and this case arose as a result of a complaint that was filed with the FPPC by a member of Mr. Cheng's staff. (Ex. A, p. 4.)

At the hearing, Respondent was charged with the following violations of the Political Reform Act (the "Act"): ¹

- COUNT 1: On or about March 15, 2010, Respondent made independent expenditures totaling approximately \$2,800 in opposition to an Arcadia City Council candidate (for the city election that was held on April 13, 2010), but Respondent failed to report the expenditures by filing a preelection statement (Form 461) on or before the due date of April 1, 2010, in violation of Sections 84200.5, subdivision (g)(2), and 84200.8.
- COUNT 2: Regarding the independent expenditures described in Count 1 above, Respondent also failed to report the expenditures by filing a supplemental independent expenditure report (Form 465) on or before the due date of April 1, 2010, in violation of Section 84203.5.
- COUNT 3: On or about April 6, 2010, Respondent sent a mass mailing in opposition to an Arcadia City Council candidate (for the city election that was held on April 13, 2010) without displaying the name, address, and city of the sender on the outside of each piece of mail, in violation of Section 84305, subdivisions (a) and (b).
- COUNT 4: On or about April 6, 2010, Respondent made independent expenditures totaling approximately \$6,575 for the mass mailing described in Count 3 above, but Respondent failed to report these expenditures by filing a late independent expenditure report (Form 496) on or before the due date of April 7, 2010, in violation of Section 84204.
- COUNT 5: Regarding the independent expenditures described in Count 4 above, Respondent also failed to report the expenditures by filing a semi-annual statement (Form 461) on or before the due date of August 2, 2010, in violation of Section 84200, subdivision (b).
- COUNT 6: Regarding the independent expenditures described in Count 4 above, Respondent also failed to report the expenditures by filing a supplemental independent expenditure report (Form 465) on or before the due date of August 2, 2010, in violation of Section 84203.5.

Lynda Cassady, Chief of the Technical Assistance Division of the FPPC, testified as an expert witness at the hearing. She explained the difference between campaign statements and reports, making it clear that it is important to file both in order to facilitate public access to information. Whereas campaign

¹ The Act is contained in Government Code sections 81000 through 91014. All statutory references are to the Government Code, unless otherwise indicated. The regulations of the Commission are contained in Sections 18110 through 18997 of Title 2 of the California Code of Regulations. All regulatory references are to Title 2, Division 6 of the California Code of Regulations, unless otherwise indicated.

statements such as Form 461's are designed to be "looked up" by the name of the major donor or independent expenditure committee, campaign reports such as Form 465's and 496's are designed to be "looked up" by the name of the candidate or ballot measure supported or opposed. Also, Ms. Cassady testified that Respondent could have called the FPPC for free advice and/or visited the FPPC website for additional information, if Respondent had questions about his filing obligations.

Following a two-day hearing, the ALJ found that Respondent did in fact commit all six of the violations set forth above. (Ex. A, p. 6.)

Also, the ALJ found that in June 2010, an investigator with the Enforcement Division of the FPPC explained to Respondent what documents needed to be filed in this case, and the investigator sent Respondent copies of the applicable forms along with related instructions. Additionally, the investigator described the resources that were available to the Respondent should he have questions. (See Ex. A, p. 4.)

After speaking with the investigator, Respondent attempted to late-file the missing forms, but what he submitted was incorrectly filled out and incomplete. Among other deficiencies, Respondent failed to provide required information regarding the identities of payees who assisted him with the mass mailings in question—effectively allowing the payees to remain anonymous. (See Ex. A, pp. 4-5.)

The Commission's investigator, and later, the prosecutor of this case, tried to contact Respondent regarding the above-described deficiencies and other matters related to this case, but Respondent ignored them. By or about July 2010, after a settlement offer had been sent to Respondent by the prosecutor, Respondent became gravely offended and enraged for reasons that are not entirely clear. It was not established that the Commission's staff did anything to warrant Respondent's refusal to cooperate. Although Respondent insisted that all communications be in writing, Respondent still failed to respond to the Enforcement Division. This included a refusal to comply with an investigative subpoena. Also, Respondent refused to submit any corrections to the documents that ultimately were submitted to the Arcadia City Clerk's office for filing, and Respondent otherwise refused to cooperate any further with Commission staff. (See Ex. A, p. 5.)

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Although Respondent's violations started out as inadvertent or negligent, he ultimately made a deliberate decision not to comply with the Political Reform Act when asked to do so by the Enforcement Division. (Ex. A, p. 7.)

At one point during the hearing, Respondent admitted to receiving a letter from the Enforcement Division with the probable cause report. The letter, which is attached hereto as Exhibit C and which was admitted into evidence at the hearing, included blank forms and instructions. In the letter, Respondent was warned that if he did not correct his filing deficiencies by properly completing and filing the enclosed forms, the Enforcement Division would ask for a higher penalty at the hearing pursuant to Regulation 18361.5, subdivision (d). (That regulation authorizes the Commission and the ALJ to consider—when determining the amount of a penalty—whether a violator, upon learning of a reporting violation, voluntarily filed amendments to provide full disclosure.)

During cross-examination at the hearing, Respondent testified that he threw the forms and instructions in the trash. Thereafter, undersigned counsel asked words to the effect, "When you threw them in the trash, did it occur to you that I might ask for a higher penalty at the hearing?"

In response, Respondent screamed words to the effect, "I don't care how high the penalty is!" Accordingly, the proposed decision of the ALJ imposed a penalty of \$5,250. In so doing, the ALJ stated (in Ex. A, pp. 7-8):

> 12A. During the hearing, Complainant requested a fine of \$1,000 be imposed for each of the six violations. Based on the circumstances, that request is reasonable, with one exception. Count three of the Accusation pertains to Respondent's failure to include his identification information on the outside of the April mass mailer. That was purely a technical violation. Moreover it would have been clear to anyone who read the mailer that Respondent was responsible for sending it. There was no way for Respondent to correct that violation once it happened. Thus, a fine of \$250 is warranted for that violation.

> However, the other five counts are a different matter. Although Respondent's initial violations were inadvertent, he thereafter failed to fully correct them, even after advice and information sent to him from Commission staff. After he initially cooperated, Respondent later completely ignored staff contacts. He could have easily corrected his deficient filings, but refused to do so. Under these circumstances, a fine of \$1,000 for each of those five violations is warranted.

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B. Enforcement Division's Position

Regulation 18361.9 requires the Enforcement Division to submit this opening brief but does not mandate its contents. Rather, subdivision (b)(1) of that regulation provides that the Enforcement Division *may* address the following matters in its opening brief:

 Whether the facts stated in the proposed decision are consistent with the evidence presented.

The ALJ did a very good job of summarizing most of the evidence that was admitted at the hearing, with the following exceptions:

a. The proposed decision should include a more specific finding regarding

Respondent's willful refusal to provide full disclosure in this case—even after

he was provided with forms and instructions by the Enforcement Division.

At one point during the hearing, Respondent admitted to receiving a letter from the Enforcement Division with the probable cause report. (Ex. C.) The letter, which was admitted into evidence at the hearing, included blank forms and instructions. In the letter, Respondent was warned that if he did not correct his filing deficiencies by properly completing and filing the enclosed forms, the Enforcement Division would ask for a higher penalty at the hearing pursuant to Regulation 18361.5, subdivision (d). (That regulation authorizes the Commission and the ALJ to consider—when determining the amount of a penalty—whether a violator, upon learning of a reporting violation, voluntarily filed amendments to provide full disclosure.)²

² Also, the letter stated, "[P]lease bear in mind that where the forms call for the names and addresses of payees, you are required to provide the names and addresses of the vendors (and in some cases subvendors) who received payment for the design, printing, addressing, mailing (including postage), etc. of your mass mailings. It is insufficient simply to list yourself as the payee or simply to list a description of each mass mailing as the payee." Additionally, the letter stated, "[P]lease bear in mind that where the forms call for descriptions of the payments/expenditures relative to each payee, you are required to describe the goods or services provided by each payee. It is insufficient simply to list a general description of each mass mailing without including a description of the goods or services provided by each payee in furtherance of the mass mailing."

During cross-examination at the hearing, Respondent testified that he threw the forms and instructions in the trash. Thereafter, undersigned counsel asked words to the effect, "When you threw them in the trash, did it occur to you that I might ask for a higher penalty at the hearing?"

In response, Respondent screamed words to the effect, "I don't care how high the penalty is!"

b. The proposed decision omits certain, important background information regarding the circumstances surrounding and leading up to the mass mailings in this case.

As stated in the proposed decision, the candidate in this case, Mr. Cheng, also is an attorney. In the scope of his practice, he filed a lawsuit against a business in the San Gabriel Valley area.

Respondent became involved with helping to defend the defendants in that lawsuit, and Respondent campaigned against Mr. Cheng in connection with the Arcadia City Council election. (See Ex. A, p. 2.)

However, the proposed decision omits reference to important background information, which was established at the hearing. Specifically, in January 2010, Respondent believed that he had reached a settlement agreement with Mr. Cheng regarding the lawsuit mentioned above. The terms included the following: (i) Mr. Cheng would dismiss the lawsuit in exchange for a \$5,000 payment from Respondent; (ii) Respondent would stop campaigning against Mr. Cheng; and (iii) Respondent would help Mr. Cheng win the election. However, the settlement was not finalized. Mr. Cheng withdrew from the case, and Respondent continued his campaign against Mr. Cheng. (See letter from Respondent dated March 25, 2010, which is included in Ex. B.)

c. Ideally, a summary of the expert testimony of Lynda Cassady, Chief of the Technical Assistance Division of the FPPC, should have been included in the proposed decision.

Lynda Cassady, Chief of the Technical Assistance Division of the FPPC, testified as an expert witness at the hearing. She explained the difference between campaign statements and reports, making it clear that it is important to file both in order to facilitate public access to information. Whereas campaign statements such as Form 461's are designed to be "looked up" by the name of the major donor or independent expenditure committee, campaign reports such as Form 465's and 496's are designed to be "looked up" by the name of the candidate or ballot measure supported or opposed. Also, Ms. Cassady

testified that Respondent could have called the FPPC for free advice and/or visited the FPPC website for additional information, if he had questions about his filing obligations.

d. The proposed decision states that Mr. Cheng was an incumbent (Ex. A, p. 2), but he was not an incumbent.

This is a minor error—but worth mentioning for clarification purposes.

2. Whether the proposed decision contains an accurate statement and/or application of the law.

The Enforcement Division does not take issue with the proposed decision in this regard

3. Whether there is additional material evidence that could not, with reasonable diligence, have been discovered and presented at the administrative hearing.

No such evidence is known to exist.

4. Which of the dispositions provided for in Government Code section 11517 is recommended by the Enforcement Division and why.

Government Code section 11517, subdivision (c)(2), provides that within 100 days of the Commission's receipt of the proposed decision, the Commission may do any of the following:

- Adopt the proposed decision in its entirety.
- Reduce or otherwise mitigate the proposed penalty and adopt the balance of the proposed decision.
- Make technical or other minor changes in the proposed decision and adopt it as the decision.
 However, action by the Commission in this regard is limited to "a clarifying change or a change of a similar nature that does not affect the factual or legal basis of the proposed decision."
- Reject the proposed decision and refer the case back to the ALJ to take additional evidence and prepare a revised, proposed decision.
- Reject the proposed decision, and decide the case upon the record, including the transcript, or
 upon an agreed statement of the parties, with or without taking additional evidence. (By
 stipulation of the parties, the Commission may decide the case upon the record without

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including the transcript.) If the Commission chooses this option, all of the following provisions apply:

- (i) A copy of the record shall be made available to the parties. The Commission may require payment of fees covering direct costs of making the copy.
- (ii) The Commission itself shall not decide the case without affording the parties the opportunity to present either oral or written argument before the Commission itself. If additional oral evidence is introduced before the Commission itself, no Commission member may vote unless the member heard the additional oral evidence.
- (iii) The authority of the Commission itself to decide the case in this regard includes authority to decide some but not all issues in the case.

In this case, the Enforcement Division recommends that the Commission adopt the proposed decision in its entirety. Although the ALJ omitted certain factual matters from the proposed decision—as described above—these matters are not necessary to support the ALJ's proposed penalty of \$5,250. However, it is hoped that the Commission will bear these matters in mind should Respondent come before the Commission and ask for a reduced penalty.

5. Any other issue the Enforcement Division determines to be relevant.

Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a copy of *Tong v. McMahon* (1998) 145 F.3d 1341, which documents that at least one federal court has imposed a vexatious litigant order against Respondent. At the hearing, this was offered into evidence because it tends to show that Respondent, a non-lawyer, has more familiarity with the litigation process than your average non-lawyer, and he should have known better than to deliberately refuse to comply with the Political Reform Act after the Enforcement Division sent him forms and instructions. Also, Respondent's vexatious litigant history evidences a certain degree of legal experience, which is consistent with Respondent helping to defend the defendants in the civil action that Mr. Cheng filed against the business in the San Gabriel Valley. (Ex. A, p. 2.) As stated above, this legal experience extended to Respondent entering into settlement negotiations with Mr. Cheng on behalf of the defendants. These facts all show that Respondent is or should be quite familiar with how settlement negotiations work, and when the Enforcement Division offered to settle this case

1	with Respondent in July 2010, there was no legitimate reason for Respondent to view the Enforcement	
2	Division's settlement offer as harassment. (See Ex. A, p. 5.)	
3	Although the ALJ excluded the case of <i>Tong v. McMahon</i> (1998) 145 F.3d 1341 and stated that	
4	was more prejudicial than probative, the Enforcement Division takes the position that—for the reasons	
5	stated above—Respondent's vexatious litigant history falls into the category of "Any other issue the	
6	Enforcement Division determines to be relevant [for purposes of this opening brief]." (Regulation	
7	18361.9, subd. (b)(1)(E).)	
8	II. CONCLUSION	
9	For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the Commission should adopt the	
10	ALJ's proposed decision in its entirety.	
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12	Dated: FAIR POLITICAL PRACTICES COMMISSION	
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14	By:	
15	NEAL P. BUCKNELL Senior Commission Counsel	
16	Attorney for Complainant	
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