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6	Attorneys for Complainant	
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8	BEFORE THE FAIR POLITICAL PRACTICES COMMISSION	
9	STATE OF CALIFORNIA	
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11	In the Matter of:	FPPC Case No. 17/453
12	KATHRIN SEARS,	STIPULATION, DECISION AND ORDER
13	Respondent.	
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15	INTRODUCTION	
16	Kathrin Sears is currently a Marin County Supervisor and has been since 2011. Additionally,	
17	Sears is the Chair of the MCE Clean Energy Board. Sears was appointed to the MCE Clean Energy	
18	Board ("Board") by Marin County.	
19	This case involves a violation of the conflict of interest provisions of the Political Reform Act.	
20	SUMMARY OF THE LAW	
21	The Act and its regulations are amended from time to time. For this reason, all legal references	
22	and discussions of law pertain to the Act's provisions as they existed at that time—unless otherwise	
23	noted.	
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27 28	¹ The Political Reform Act—sometimes simply referred to as the Act—is contained in Government Code sections 81000 through 91014. All statutory references are to this code. The regulations of the Fair Political Practices Commission are contained in Sections 18110 through 18997 of Title 2 of the California Code of Regulations. All regulatory references are to this source.	

Need for Liberal Construction and Vigorous Enforcement of the Political Reform Act

When enacting the Political Reform Act, the people of California found and declared that previous laws regulating political practices suffered from inadequate enforcement by state and local authorities.² Thus, it was decreed that the Act "should be liberally construed to accomplish its purposes."³

One purpose of the Act is to promote transparency and prohibit conflicts of interest by ensuring that public officials disclose their assets and income.⁴ Along these lines, the Act includes comprehensive disclosure requirements.⁵ Another purpose of the Act is to provide adequate enforcement mechanisms so that the Act will be "vigorously enforced."

Conflicts of Interest

A public official may not make, participate in making or attempt to use her official position to influence a governmental decision in which she knows, or has reason to know, she has a financial interest.⁷ A public official includes a member, officer, employee or consultant of a state or local governmental agency and any person designated as such by the conflict of interest code of the official's agency.⁸ A public official makes a governmental decision when the official, acting within the authority of her office or position, enters into a contractual agreement on behalf of her agency.⁹ A public official has a financial interest in a decision if it is reasonably foreseeable that the decision will have a material financial effect on any business entity in which the official has a direct or indirect investment worth two thousand dollars or more.¹⁰ A business entity is a "parent" if it is a corporation that controls more than 50% of the voting stock of another corporation.¹¹ A business entity is directly involved in a decision before the official's agency when that business is a named party in, or is the subject of, the proceeding

² Section 81001, subdivision (h).

³ Section 81003.

⁴ Section 81002, subdivision (c).

⁵ Sections 87200, et seq.

⁶ Section 81002, subdivision (f).

⁷ Section 87100.

⁸ Section 82048 and Regulation 18940.1(b).

⁹ Former Regulation 18702.1, subdivision (a).

¹⁰ Section 87103 and Former Regulation 18704.1, subdivision (a)(2)

¹¹ Former Regulation 18700.3, subdivision (b)(1).

¹² Former Section 18704.1, (a)(2).

concerning the decision before the official or the official's agency.¹² The reasonably foreseeable financial effect of a governmental decision on a business entity in which an official has a financial interest is presumed material if the financial interest is the subject of the governmental decision.¹³

SUMMARY OF THE FACTS

Sears has been a member of the Marin County Board of Supervisors since 2011. Marin County appointed Sears to the Board. Sears is the Chair of the Board, a designated position in the agency's conflict of interest code. As Chair of the Board, Sears was authorized to execute short term power purchase agreements for energy. In this capacity, on November 14, 2014, Sears signed a contract with Shell Energy North America for a term of 3 years, from January 1, 2015, though December 31, 2017, with a maximum annual amount of approximately \$5 million for hydroelectric power.

At the time of signing this contract with Shell Energy North America, she owned stock in Royal Dutch Shell, the parent company to Shell Energy North America, of approximately \$27,750. Sears disclosed her interest in the Royal Dutch Shell stock on her 2014 Annual Statements of Economic Interests. Sears inherited the stock from her parents after her mother's death. She contends that she did not actively trade the stock and did not recall that she owned the stock at the time she participated in the decision.

This case was opened as the result of a formal complaint alleging a conflict of interest under the Act and a Government Code Section 1090 violation. After review of the evidence, the Enforcement Division did not charge the Government Code Section 1090 based on the non-interest exemption in Section 1091.5, subdivision (a)(1), which states that an official has a non-interest in a business corporation, in which they own less than 3% of its shares, as long as the official's total annual income from dividends and stock dividends from the corporation amounts to less than 5% of his or her total annual income and any other income received from the corporation also amounts to less than 5% of his or her total annual income.

¹³ Former Regulations 18704.1, subdivision (a)(2); 18705.1, subdivision (b)(1) and 18706.

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VIOLATIONS

Count 1

Conflict of Interest

Sears, who owned Royal Dutch Shell stock, the parent company to Shell Energy North America, valued at over \$2,000, reviewed and signed the contract with Shell Energy North America as the Chair of the Board. This decision had a reasonably foreseeable material financial effect on Shell Energy North America because it resulted in Shell Energy North America receiving a contract to provide energy with a maximum annual amount of approximately \$5 million.

In this way, Sears violated Section 87100.

PROPOSED PENALTY

This matter consists of one count. The maximum penalty that may be imposed is \$5,000 per count.14

In determining the appropriate penalty for a particular violation of the Act, the Commission considers the facts of the case, the public harm involved, and the purposes of the Act. Also, the Commission considers factors such as: (a) the seriousness of the violation; (b) the presence or absence of any intention to conceal, deceive or mislead; (c) whether the violation was deliberate, negligent or inadvertent; (d) whether the violation was isolated or part of a pattern; (e) whether corrective amendments voluntarily were filed to provide full disclosure; and (f) whether the violator has a prior record of violations. ¹⁵ Additionally, the Commission considers penalties in prior cases with comparable violations.

Applying the factors to this case, a conflict of interest violation is a serious violation under the Act. However, the evidence suggests that there was no intent to conceal, deceive or mislead, as the stock was timely disclosed on her SEIs. She contends she did not realize she had a conflict of interest when she participated in making the decision, and made no attempt to conceal her action or financial interest. Furthermore, after learning of her mistake, Sears contends she divested the stock on May 15, 2017, in

¹⁴ See Section 83116, subdivision (c).

¹⁵ Regulation 18361.5, subdivision (d).

¹⁶ Former Regulation 18705.1, subdivision (b)(2).

order to eliminate the potential for future conflicts related to Shell Energy North America and this incident was isolated and not part of a pattern.

The Commission approved a settlement in a similar type of case. *In the Matter of Gregory Cox, FPPC No. 16/292*, in April 2016, the Commission approved a settlement involving the Coastal Commissioner Gregory Cox, who voted on a matter involving SeaWorld while he and his wife owned approximately \$8,679 in SeaWorld stock. In mitigation, Cox contended that he did not realize his wife purchased the SeaWorld stock and he self-reported this conflict of interest. A penalty of \$3,000 was imposed for this violation.

In the Matter of Simon Lee, FPPC No. 16/677, in September 2017, the Commission approved a settlement involving an alternate member of the City of San Marino Planning Commission and a member of the City of San Marino Design Review Committee Simon Lee, an architect who owned Simon Lee & Associates. Lee, in his capacity as a member of the Design Review Committee, voted to approve two separate applications for clients to his firm, of which he received income of \$500 or more within the prior 12 months. In aggravation, Lee received income of \$50,000 from each client whose projects he approved while on the Design Review Committee and failed to disclose the income on the relevant Statement of Economic Interest. A penalty of \$3,500 was imposed for each conflict of interest violation.

In this matter, Sears fully cooperated with the Enforcement Division and agreed to settle early in this case. Further, she does not have a history of prior violations of the Act. While an exception to the presumption of materiality existed at the time of this violation where a public official's investment in a business entity listed in the Fortune 500 is \$25,000 or less would cause the application of the standards for indirectly involved business entities to be applied instead, this exception does not apply in this case since Sears' interest was over the threshold.¹⁶

For the foregoing reasons, the total penalty that is being recommended in this case is \$3,000.

CONCLUSION

Complainant, the Enforcement Division of the Fair Political Practices Commission, and Respondent Kathrin Sears hereby agrees as follows:

- 1. Respondent violated the Act as described in the foregoing pages, which are a true and accurate summary of the facts in this matter.
- 2. This stipulation will be submitted for consideration by the Fair Political Practices

 Commission at its next regularly scheduled meeting—or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard.
- 3. This stipulation resolves all factual and legal issues raised in this matter—for the purpose of reaching a final disposition without the necessity of holding an administrative hearing to determine the liability of Respondent pursuant to Section 83116.
- 4. Respondent has consulted with her attorney, James Harrison of Remcho, Johansen & Purcell, LLP, and understands, and hereby knowingly and voluntarily waives, all procedural rights set forth in Sections 83115.5, 11503, 11523, and Regulations 18361.1 through 18361.9. This includes, but is not limited to the right to appear personally at any administrative hearing held in this matter, to be represented by an attorney at Respondent's own expense, to confront and cross-examine all witnesses testifying at the hearing, to subpoena witnesses to testify at the hearing, to have an impartial administrative law judge preside over the hearing as a hearing officer, and to have the matter judicially reviewed.
- 5. Respondent agrees to the issuance of the decision and order set forth below. Also, Respondent agrees to the Commission imposing against her an administrative penalty in the amount of \$3,000. One or more cashier's checks or money orders totaling said amount—to be paid to the General Fund of the State of California—is/are submitted with this stipulation as full payment of the administrative penalty described above, and same shall be held by the State of California until the Commission issues its decision and order regarding this matter.
- 6. If the Commission refuses to approve this stipulation—then this stipulation shall become null and void, and within fifteen business days after the Commission meeting at which the stipulation is rejected, all payments tendered by Respondent in connection with this stipulation shall be reimbursed to Respondent. If this stipulation is not approved by the Commission, and if a full evidentiary hearing before the Commission becomes necessary, neither any member of the Commission, nor the Executive Director, shall be disqualified because of prior consideration of this Stipulation.
 - 7. The parties to this agreement may execute their respective signature pages separately. A

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1	copy of any party's executed signature page—including a hardcopy of a signature page transmitted via	
2	fax or as a PDF email attachment—is as effective and binding as the original.	
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5	Dated:	
6	Galena West, Chief of Enforcement Fair Political Practices Commission	
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8	Dated:	
9	Kathrin Sears, Respondent	
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13	The foregoing stipulation of the parties "In the Matter of Kathrin Sears," FPPC Case No. 17/453	
14	is hereby accepted as the final decision and order of the Fair Political Practices Commission, effective	
15	upon execution below by the Chair.	
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17	IT IS SO ORDERED.	
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19	Dated: Joann Remke, Chair	
20	Fair Political Practices Commission	
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